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Abstract:  Recent empirical studies suggest that the average marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) has declined. This paper explains the declining trend of the MPC with a 
standard representative consumer model where borrowing constraints become more 
relaxed as suggested by data. With an increase in available credit, the consumer can 
easily spread out negative income shocks by credit card borrowing or consumer loans. As 
a result, consumers under relaxed borrowing constraints have lower MPCs than they had 
a generation ago. This result suggests that policy makers should now account for the less 
responsiveness of consumers to fiscal stimulus plans aiming at boosting consumption. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The issue of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) has attracted attention from 
economists and policy makers because it is considered to determine the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy aimed at boosting consumption. However, rigorous theoretical studies of the 
MPC, when consumers face uncertainty, have been recently undertaken. Carroll and 
Kimball (1996) compare a model where consumers face uncertainty and borrowing 
constraints to one where consumers have perfect foresight and can borrow as much as 
they like, as is typically assumed in the traditional permanent/life-cycle income 
hypothesis. The authors show that the introduction of uncertainty and borrowing 
constraints into the model causes the MPC to rise relative to the perfect foresight and 
unconstrained case and that the MPC rises more for consumers with low wealth than 
those with high wealth because the consumption is concave over wealth. Carroll (2001) 
argues that a high growth rate in income and/or a high rate of discounting the future (or 
more accurately the “impatience” of consumers) determine the MPC, rather than 
borrowing constraints per se. 
  Along with these theoretical studies, recent empirical studies suggest that the 
MPC may have declined during the last one or two decades. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) 
found that 43% of surveyed consumers were willing to spend the temporary increase in 
their take-home income in response to the changes in income tax withholding in 1992, 
even though the temporary increase in income was likely to be offset by the 
approximately equally sized decrease in tax refund or increase in tax within a year due to 
the roughly constant overall annual tax liability. However, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) 
reported that only 22% of respondents were willing to spend the tax rebate resulted from   2
the ten-year tax cut policy in 2001 in another similar survey. Their findings in two 
surveys are surprising for two reasons. First, although the authors use the same survey 
methodology and very similar questionnaires, the responses are noticeably different. 
Second, while the change in life-time income due to the 1992 tax withholding change 
was negligible, the life-time income change due to the 2001 tax cuts was substantial if the 
tax cuts were to be completely implemented.
1  However, consumers’ responses from 
the1992 policy change are far greater than those from the 2001 tax cut policy, which 
contradicts a prediction of the permanent/life-cycle income hypothesis. Furthermore, 
different responses in 1992 and 2001 suggest different MPCs in both years. Assuming a 
specific distribution on the MPC across consumers as described in Shapiro and Slemrod 
(2002), these figures imply that the average MPC is approximately 0.47 in 1992 and 0.33 
in 2001
2 
  Other evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the average MPC has 
declined over time.  A New York Times/CBS News poll in May 1982 found that 
approximately 50% of consumers in a survey said that they would spend the increase in 
take-home income due to the tax cuts proposed by the Reagan administration (Souleles 
(2002)), while Gallup Poll in July 2001 reported that only 17% of respondents said that 
they would spend the 2001 tax rebate from the tax cut (Shapiro and Slemrod (2002)). In 
addition, Souleles (2002) estimates the average MPC in response to the 1982 tax cut to lie 
between 0.6 and 0.9, while Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2004) estimate the average 
MPC in response to the 2001 tax cut to lie between 0.2 and 0.4.  Although standard errors 
                                                 
1 In the 2001 survey that Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) examined, many consumers did not believe the 
government’s tax cut policy as literally as the policy said. Most respondents were pessimistic about the size 
of future tax cuts. 
2 Refer to the Appendix Table for the range of the average the MPC when distribution parameters change.   3
of the estimates and different identification assumptions
3 in the two studies make direct 
comparisons of the two sets of estimates difficult, the declining tendency in the MPC 
certainly appears to exist.
4 
A possible explanation for the above findings could be the mental accounting 
hypothesis by Thaler (1990) who postulates that different sources of income result in 
different MPCs. With the 1982 tax cut and the 1992 change in tax withholding, the take-
home income was increased, while the 2001 tax rebate was delivered to each household 
as a separate check. Hence, Thaler’s (1990) ad hoc assumption that the MPC from a 
separate check is lower than the MPC from increased income from regularly-timed 
paycheck could explain the findings. However, this paper attempts to explain the 
declining trend of the MPC with a standard representative consumer model rather than 
relying on the behavioral assumption by Thaler (1990). We simulate a model that predicts 
a declining average MPC when forward-looking consumers optimally respond to an 
increase in available credit. 
  While the MPC is declining, the widespread use of credit cards has made 
borrowing accessible for most US households.  The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances 
reports that 76.2% of the US households have at least one credit card and two thirds of 
them hold positive amounts of credit card debt (Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore (2003) 
and Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003)). At the same time, the credit card debt has 
grown over 10% per year since credit cards were introduced in mid 1970s, implying 
                                                 
3 While the 1982 tax cuts proposed by Reagan administration is identified as the change in tax withholding 
in Souleles (2002), the 2001 tax cuts proposed by Bush administration is identified as the mailing of tax 
rebate checks. 
4 Among related studies, Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) obtain low MPC estimates during the 1980s. 
However, these low estimates are probably due to the fact that the temporary increases in income, 
identified as the change in Social Security tax withholding or tax refund, are similar to the regular annual 
payments in Hsieh (2003) in the sense that those increases are repeated every year. Hsieh (2003) finds that 
consumption does not respond to well-anticipated regular payments.     4
approximately a 250% growth rate per decade (Yoo (1998) and Manning (2000)). 
Furthermore, Gross and Souleles (2002) report that the average credit limit (i.e., 
borrowing potential) per credit card account is 2.5 times the average US monthly 
individual income.
5 
  Thus, this paper tries to explain the apparent decline in the average MPC by using 
a partial equilibrium model in which borrowing constraints on consumers are relaxed. 
After solving the representative consumer problem, this paper shows that Carroll’s (2001) 
argument that the consumer’s impatience is the key factor to determine the MPC is 
approximately true when the change in borrowing constraints is small. However, if the 
change in borrowing constraints is significantly large as suggested by data, this paper 
shows through simulations that the MPC declines as the borrowing constraints become 
relaxed. Since consumers can spread negative income shocks out more freely, consumers 
under relaxed borrowing constraints have lower MPCs. That is, while a large negative 
income shock such as a temporary lay-off forced a consumer to reduce her consumption 
drastically and to have a high MPC in the past time, such a shock can be spread out over 
periods by the credit card borrowing and the consumer does not need to reduce her 
consumption drastically these days. As a result, the MPC of a consumer with relaxed 
borrowing constraints can continue to be low and additional income is used to pay off 
debt rather than spent on additional consumption. This result suggests that both 
borrowing constraints and the consumer’s impatience are important factors to determine 
the MPC. 
                                                 
5 Ludvigson (1999) shows that the ratio of consumer loan to personal income has also grown by more than 
200% since World War II.   5
  The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section II presents the optimization 
problem for a representative consumer when he faces uncertainty about labor income.  
Section III provides simulation results and their interpretation for the consumer model.  
Section IV offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. The Model 
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where  0 E   denotes the conditional expectation given information at time 0,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β  
denotes the time discount rate, R denotes the risk-free gross interest rate,  t C  denotes 
consumption at time t,  t Y  denotes labor income at time t, and  t X  denotes the resource 
available for consumption (cash-on-hand).  t P  is the permanent component of the labor 
income, and  t ε  and  t N   are temporary and permanent shocks in the labor income, 
respectively.  t ε  can be interpreted as temporary bonuses, lay-offs or illnesses, while  t N    6
can be interpreted as promotions or demotions in the career of the consumer. G, the gross 
growth rate of  t P , is assumed to be constant. 
  While equations (1) through (4) are conventional, Equation (5) states that the 
consumer is allowed to borrow up to a fraction of permanent component in the labor 
income ) ( t kP , where  0 ≥ k  and k is known to consumers. When  0 = k , the consumer is 
not allowed to borrow at all. As k increases, the borrowing constraint becomes more 
relaxed and the consumer is allowed to borrow more. Thus, borrowing constraints are 
introduced as quantity constraints rather than price constraints, i.e., rather than a gap 
between borrowing and lending rates. Ludvigson (1999) presents evidence that actual 
lenders usually want to put the limit of borrowing as a fraction of permanent income. A 
change in the consumer’s borrowing constraints due to the increase of credit limit in the 
credit card account or fluctuations in consumer loan condition can be reflected by the 
change in k. 
  As is well known, the above problem has no analytic solution due to the presence 
of the uncertainty in the future labor income. Hence, we apply numerical methods to 
solve the problem and obtain numerical solutions. Like other studies in consumption 
literature, we first take advantage of the recursive nature of the problem and then 
normalize all variables by  t P   to reduce the number of state variables. Thus, the 
consumer’s problem can be rewritten in the following form: 
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Lower-case letters are defined as  t t t P X x / = ,   t t t P C c / = , and so on. To allow the 
normalization by  t P , the consumer is assumed to have the constant relative risk aversion 












C u  when  0 > γ ; if  1 = γ ,  t t C C u ln ) ( = .
6  
  To obtain numerical solutions, we set  05 . 1 / 1 = β , R = 1.02, and G = 1.02. The 
log values of labor income shocks,  t ε ln  and  t N ln , are assumed to be independently, 
identically, and normally distributed with mean zero and variances 
2
ε σ  and 
2
N σ , 
respectively. Using empirical estimates from Carroll (1992),  ε σ  and  N σ  are  both  set 
equal to be 0.10. We also use discrete approximations of the distributions of shocks,  t ε  
and  t N  in numerical methods. Under these parameter values, the following condition 
holds: 
  1 ] ) [( 1 <
−
+
γ β t t GN E R .         ( 9 )  
This condition is often known as “impatience condition” which ensures that the optimal 
consumption policy function converges to the unique infinite horizon solution and that 
the consumer wants to borrow when there is no borrowing constraint.  
  Denoting the end of life as T = 100, we compute the optimal consumption 
function recursively and consider the first period consumption function  )) ( ( 1 x c  as the 
converged consumption function  )) ( ( x c , since  0001 . 0 2 1 < − c c . We use a definition of 
the converged function from period 1 to define the MPC and evaluate its properties when 
the CRRA coefficient  ) (γ  and borrowing constraint parameter (k) change. The maximum 
                                                 
6 The assumption of CRRA utility function will be relaxed by the use of Kreps-Porteus preferences in the 
next section.   8
bound of k (2.5) is chosen considering the average credit limit per credit card and per 
capita GDP in the US. Gross and Souleles (2002) report that the average credit limit per 
credit card account is $6,207 from January 1995 through January 1998, while the average 
per capita annual GDP in the US from 1995 through 1997 is $29,296, which implies a 
monthly income of $2,441.
7 Since the billing cycle of credit cards is usually one month, 
these numbers suggest that the average consumer can borrow up to  ) 2441 / 6207 ( 5 . 2 ≈  
times of their income. Certainly, this is a conservative estimate about the limit of 
borrowing because a consumer is implicitly assumed to hold only one credit card and 
have no other personal loans.
8 Under this set-up, we perform simulations to investigate 
the effect of borrowing constraints changes on the MPC. 
 
III. Simulation Results 
To investigate whether the declining trend of the MPC can be explained by a standard 
representative consumer model, we calculate the average MPC across an economy of 
4,000 consumers who follow the converged optimal consumption rule in the previous 
section, but who are subject to different realizations of income shocks randomly drawn 
from the corresponding distributions. Each consumer is endowed with a level of 
resources at the beginning of his working life.  This initial endowment is randomly drawn 
from the estimated distribution of initial liquid wealth in Gourinchas and Parker (2002). 
To calculate a stable distribution of cash-on-hand across consumers, we use the level of 
normalized cash-on-hand in the current period to calculate current optimal consumption 
and the level of resources carried to the next period. We perform this exercise for 100 
                                                 
7 The US per capita GDPs are taken from Penn World Table 6.1.  
8 Manning (2000, page 6) reports that “the typical American adult has about four retail, three bank, nearly 
one gasoline, and a travel and entertainment or a miscellaneous credit card.”    9
periods to obtain the economy’s distribution of cash-on-hand.  It is from this stable 
distribution that we calculate the MPC for each consumer: 
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Thus, equation (10) measures the MPC from temporary income changes, such as those 
from temporary tax cuts.  Finally, we calculate the average of (10) across consumers. 
  Figures 1, 2 and 3 represent changes in optimal consumption as borrowing 
constraints change, when the CRRA coefficient  1 = γ , 2, and 3, respectively. 
Consistently with previous studies, the consumption functions are concave and that 
optimal consumption is lower at all levels of cash-on-hand when γ  is higher, holding k 
constant.  As k increases for a fixed γ , the consumption function shifts to the left, 
implying greater borrowing to achieve a fixed level of consumption, or more intuitively, 
greater consumption at a fixed level of resources.  This finding suggests that even 
consumers who are not currently constrained in their ability to borrow also increase 
consumption slightly as k increases, which is consistent with the findings in Gross and 
Souleles (2002).  Those authors find that consumers who are not currently borrowing 
constrained increase their consumption slightly in response to an increase in borrowing 
capacity.  As argued by the authors, consumers with non-binding constraints raise their 
consumption due to the weakened precautionary saving motive resulting from the 
relaxation of borrowing constraints.  This interpretation is presented visually in Figures 1, 
2, and 3. 
When the change in borrowing constraints is small, the consumption function 
appears to shift by a similar amount of additional feasible borrowing regardless of the   10
level of normalized cash-on-hand, as observed in Carroll (2001).  However, for large 
changes in k, the consumption function shifts to the left by a relatively large amount for 
those consumers with low cash-on-hand relative to permanent income—that is, for 
consumers who were previously borrowing constrained.  As a result, the consumption 
function becomes flatter and the cases where consumers would be constrained are fewer.  
The point at which the borrowing constraint begins to bind (represented by the kinks in 
the consumption functions) also falls as k becomes larger. 
  Consistent with these figures, Table 1 clearly shows that the average MPC falls as 
k increases. Specifically, when  1 = γ , the MPC falls from 0.44 to 0.35 as k rises from 0 to 
2.5. These values roughly coincide with the values found in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 
2002, 2003). If the average consumer could borrow 250% of his income when the 2001 
tax cut was implemented and if this borrowing ability had been increasing 10% per year 
as the credit card borrowings did in the past two decades, then the borrowing capacity (k) 
would have been approximately equal to permanent income in 1992 (k=1), when the tax 
withholding law was changed. These estimates also suggest that the MPC has fallen from 
0.41 to 0.35 between 1992 and 2001 when  1 = γ , which implies that a substantial portion 
of the decrease in the MPC can be explained by the rapid relaxation of the borrowing 
constraints due to the widespread credit cards. However, note that this prediction is 
robust for other values of CRRA coefficient γ . 
 When  k < 0.5, changes in the average MPC are not very large.  However, for k > 
0.5, the decline in the average MPC is substantial.  In this case, the consumer is able to 
better smooth temporary income shocks over time.  In other words, the effect of negative 
temporary income shocks on consumption can be more easily offset by borrowing money   11
as  k increases. As a result, fewer and fewer consumers have binding borrowing 
constraints, given the labor income process, although consumers are impatient. This 
reasoning is presented in Table 2. As k increases, the cash-on-hand is distributed at a 
wider range (higher standard deviation of the cash-on-hand) and less and less consumers 
have binding borrowing constraints.
9   
Another noteworthy point in Table 1 is that when k is held constant, the average 
MPC becomes higher as γ  decreases. Intuitively, as γ  falls, the representative consumer 
becomes less risk-averse and has a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Hence, 
the consumer with low γ   is less concerned about income shocks and is more willing to 
spread out small negative temporary shocks over time. As a result, the borrowing 
constraints are more likely to be binding to the consumer with lower γ , which implies 
higher MPC when γ  is low and k is held constant.  
To verify this line of logic, we solve the same representative consumer’s problem 
under the assumption of Kreps-Porteus preferences, which break down the tight relation 
between the risk aversion coefficient and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the 
CRRA utility function. With the optimal consumption function under Kreps-Porteus 
preferences, we also compute the average MPC from simulations of an economy based 
on 4,000 consumers. As shown in Table 3, when the risk aversion coefficient is held 
constant at 3, the average MPC increases as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
becomes higher. As consumers become more eager to spread out negative temporary 
shocks over time, consumers are more likely to have binding borrowing constraints and 
                                                 
9 The negative average cash-on-hand, however, is not an accurate description of wealth for the average or 
median household.  This result occurs because young consumers choose to borrow heavily when income is 
low, expecting that they can repay the debt sometime in the future.   12
higher MPC. Also, when elasticity of intertemporal substitution is held constant at 0.1, 
the average MPC increases as the risk aversion coefficient becomes lower. As consumers 
become less concerned about income shocks, consumers have a weaker motive of 
precautionary saving and higher MPC. All these results also suggest that the average 
MPC falls as k increases when the risk aversion coefficient and elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution are held constant because borrowing constraints are less and less likely to be 
binding with higher values of k.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper shows that the two seemingly unrelated phenomena, the declining MPC and 
rapid and widespread of credit cards, may be related to each other through consumers’ 
borrowing constraints. The current widespread use of credit cards is predicted to make 
consumers less responsive to temporary changes in income than they were a generation 
ago.  Because of this increased ability to borrow, consumers are better able to smooth 
temporary income shocks and maintain a smooth level of consumption over time. 
      Although the underlying intuition is straightforward, the relation between the 
MPC and the change of borrowing constraints resulting from the use of credit card has 
important implications in macroeconomics. First, policy makers should now account for 
the possibility that consumers will be less responsive to temporary changes in taxes than 
they were in the past due to the fact that they have greater access to credit card borrowing.  
Instead of using tax rebates to purchase additional consumption goods, consumers with 
the ability to borrow may use the temporary windfall to pay down debt or to save for   13
future consumption.  In most countries where credit card use is growing, the 
responsiveness of consumers to fiscal stimulus plans may also decrease over time. 
  Secondly, by giving consumers easy access to credit, the widespread use of credit 
cards may also have important implications for the propagation of shocks in business 
cycle shocks.  The existence and nature of borrowing constraints can play a crucial role in 
the prediction of such models. 
  Finally, the model predicts that all consumers, not just those who are currently 
borrowing constrained, respond to an increase in borrowing capacity.  This prediction is 
consistent with buffer stock models, where consumers maintain a stable stock of wealth 
to protect themselves against possible financial emergencies.  In this model, even 
consumers with a large level of cash-on-hand relative to permanent income are still 
predicted to increase consumption when borrowing constraints are relaxed, although not 
nearly as much as those consumers who hold a low level of cash-on-hand relative to 
permanent income.    14
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Table 1. Borrowing Constraints and the Average MPC under CRRA Utility Function 
 
1 = γ   2 = γ   3 = γ   Constraints 
m   m   m  
0%  0.4419 0.3728 0.3184 
10%  0.4424 0.3715 0.3148 
20%  0.4414 0.3691 0.3103 
50%  0.4344 0.3567 0.2912 
100%  0.4132 0.3268 0.2539 
250%  0.3479 0.2475 0.1751 
 
Notes. Binding point is the level of cash-on-hand where the borrowing constraints begin 
to be binding. m  is the average MPC across 4,000 consumers.   17
Table 2. Borrowing Constraints and the Distribution of Cash-on-hand under CRRA  
Utility Function 
 
1 = γ   2 = γ   3 = γ   k 
x   ) (x σ  Binding 
fraction
x   ) (x σ  Binding 
fraction
x   ) (x σ  Binding 
fraction
0% 1.034  0.108 0.486 1.059  0.117 0.309 1.087  0.128 0.197 
10% 0.934  0.109 0.479 0.961  0.118 0.294 0.991  0.129 0.179 
20% 0.835  0.110 0.469 0.863  0.120 0.273 0.896  0.131 0.162 
50% 0.542  0.121 0.416 0.579  0.132 0.220 0.626  0.145 0.108 
100%  0.069  0.155 0.309 0.132  0.170 0.124 0.213  0.186 0.044 
250%  -1.24  0.310 0.098 -1.05  0.290 0.012 -0.79  0.358 0.006 
 
Notes.  x  denotes the average normalized cash-on-hand across 4,000 consumers.  ) (x σ  
denotes the standard deviation of the normalized cash-on-hand. ‘Binding fraction’ 
represents the fraction of consumers whose borrowing constraints are binding. 
   18
Table 3. Borrowing Constraints and the Average MPC under Kreps-Porteus Preferences 
 
Risk aversion coefficient = 3 
EIS = 0.01  EIS = 0.1  EIS = 1.0 
Constraints 
m   m   m  
0%  0.250 0.281 0.499 
10%  0.236 0.265 0.467 
20%  0.227 0.251 0.451 
100% 0.156 0.168 0.358 
250% 0.045 0.088 0.075 
 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution = 0.1 
RA = 1  RA = 2  RA = 3 
Constraints 
m   m   m  
0%  0.435 0.358 0.281 
10%  0.424 0.352 0.265 
20%  0.440 0.337 0.251 
100% 0.993 0.263 0.168 
250% 0.039 0.183 0.088 
 
Notes. Binding point is the level of normalized cash-on-hand where the borrowing 
constraints begin to be binding. m  is the average MPC across 4,000 consumers. EIS 
denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and RA denotes the risk aversion 
coefficient in Kreps-Porteus preferences.   19
Figure 1. Consumption Policy Function and Borrowing Constraints under CRRA Utility  
Function ( 1 = γ ) 
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Figure 2. Consumption Policy Function and Borrowing Constraints under CRRA Utility 
Function ( 2 = γ ) 
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Figure 3. Consumption Policy Function and Borrowing Constraints under CRRA Utility  
Function ( 3 = γ ) 
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Appendix 
Table A-1. Implied Values of the Average MPC for Alternative Distributions of the 
Individual MPC 
 
a b c m  
0.0031 2.0291 0.9850 0.4715 
0.0331 2.0058 0.9900 0.4710 
0.0624 1.9831 0.9950 0.4705 
0.0912 1.9680 1.0000 0.4701 
 
See Shapiro and Slemrod (2002) for the parameterization of the distribution of individual 
MPCs. m  is the average MPC. To maintain non-negative a, c must be equal to or greater 
than 0.9850. This table computes m  based on survey results in Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995). 